Does Language Shape Thought? From Philosophy to Neuroscience

Revisiting Wittgenstein with Neuroscience

Just as surely as no leaf is completely identical to another, so surely is the concept 'leaf' formed by arbitrarily dropping these individual differences [...] and now awakens the notion that there exists in nature, apart from the leaves, something that would be 'the leaf' - perhaps an original form according to which all leaves would be woven, drawn, measured, coloured, curled, painted [...]." (Nietzsche, 1873, p.880)

Ludwig Wittgenstein is regarded as a pioneer of linguistic philosophy and one of the most influential thinkers of the 20th century. His work initiated the "linguistic turn," a momentous shift from classical philosophy to a focus on language itself. His core idea is that language is decisive for our understanding of the world; indeed, it remains a focal point of philosophy to this day. According to Wittgenstein, no person, philosopher or otherwise, is capable of forming a single meaningful thought beyond the confines of words and sentences. This is captured in his famous statement: "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world" (Wittgenstein 1915-16, p.67).

Ultimately, Wittgenstein argues, there is no escape from this "cage" of language. It constitutes the only path to forming knowledge, perceiving the world, categorising it, and grasping thoughts. It would be utterly senseless to even attempt to consider anything outside of language. As he put it, "this running up against the walls of our cage is perfectly and absolutely hopeless" (Wittgenstein 1989, p.19). Our thoughts, therefore, are not free. When thinking in language, meanings do not float alongside the linguistic expressions, because, as Wittgenstein asserts, language itself is the vehicle of thought, the mirror of reality. It is both the tool and the vessel for our thinking. This means that everything that occurs in our minds, every thought, every insight, takes place in words and sentences and is thus constrained by the language we use.

This idea, however, was not Wittgenstein’s alone. Friedrich Nietzsche had already noted the discrepancy between language and reality, asking: "Do the designations and the things coincide? Is language the adequate expression of all realities?" (Nietzsche, 1873, p.878). His answer was no. Nietzsche had already grasped the thought that we only create images of facts but can never capture the facts themselves in mental constructs. He argued that when we invent a uniformly valid and binding designation for things, the "legislation of language" also provides the first laws of truth. This process is flawed from the outset, because, as Nietzsche states, "every concept arises from the equation of unequal things" (Nietzsche, 1873, p. 880). He concludes that the existence of so many languages proves that words are never concerned with truth or adequate expression. What, then, is truth? "A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms. […] truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions ” (Nietzsche, 1873, p. 880 f.). Nietzsches solution? We must not let ourselves be guided by the logically thinking intellect, by the framework of concepts, but only by our intuition. And this intuition is in its essential core nothing other than the instinctive will to life or also the will to power. We must admit to ourselves. But I digress.

Wittgenstein himself later questioned his rigid stance. In his later work, he introduced the concept of "language-games," recognising that in everyday use, language is employed far more broadly than for merely describing facts. The meaning of words, he realised, is given by the specific contexts in which they are used, the everyday conversations among children, workers, theologians, and scientists. Each of these "games" follows its own rules, and every person participates in a multitude of them, profoundly shaping their perception and way of life. This means, while language is the vehicle of thought, this vehicle is modulated by a broader context. That means if we want to understand language we have to understand how it is used in specific social contexts. While this is not necessarily important for this article, I wanted to point out that Wittgenstein’s stance developed substantially in his later work.

From Philosophy to Science: The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis

Now, building on Wittgenstein’s insights, one of the foundational ideas linking language and cognition is the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis. This hypothesis can be seen as an empirical extension of Wittgenstein’s framework, at least in my view. Whorf argued that our habitual use of language shapes how we perceive and interpret reality. The hypothesis exists in two forms: a weak version (linguistic relativity) and a strong version (linguistic determinism).

The strong version claims that differences between languages lead to equally deep differences in thought. In this view, if a language lacks a particular word or grammatical form, its speakers cannot fully grasp the corresponding concept. Grammar, structure, and vocabulary thus completely determine cognitive categories, resulting in worldviews that differ radically between languages. This largely aligns with Wittgensteins early works.

The weak version, by contrast, proposes a subtler link. It holds that language influences thought without entirely determining it. For example, speakers of different languages may attend to different aspects of reality depending on the structures and conventions of their language. In other words, language can channel attention toward certain features of experience while downplaying others.

Now, enough with theory.

To move this question from the realm of philosophical speculation to empirical investigation, we turn to the fields of psychology and neuroscience. How important is Language really?

The Empirical Evidence for Linguistic Relativity

Remembering early Wittgenstein, without language, thinking and understanding logically is "absolutely hopeless."

Research has indeed shown that different languages impose different grammatical and syntactic frameworks, which can influence what speakers notice and how they conceptualize the world (Slobin, 1987). For instance, in German, the word for bridge (die Brücke) is grammatically feminine, while in Spanish it is masculine (el puente). Such distinctions may subtly affect the mental representation of objects, even extending to broader conceptualizations, though this should not be overstated. "In many ways the language people speak is a guide to the language in which they think." (Hunt & Agnoli, 1991, p.377). Importantly, these differences may be largely implicit.

A more robust example comes from Boroditsky (2001), who studied how English and Mandarin speakers conceptualize time. English speakers typically represent time along a horizontal axis (left to right), while Mandarin speakers often use a vertical axis (top to bottom). In experiments, participants performed more accurately when reasoning about time in a spatial orientation consistent with their native language. This demonstrates that semantic "thought cages" can shape cognitive patterns. Notably, when speakers learn a new language, these differences diminish, suggesting that the influence of language on thought is flexible rather than rigid. This means language can indeed influence our thought processes, but through learning a different language we can alter this seemingly rigid system. This flexibility means the weaker form of Whorf's theory of linguistic relativity definitely holds merit.

Boroditsky (2001)

Boroditsky (2001): “Mandarin speakers were faster to confirm that March comes earlier than April if they had just seen a vertical array of objects than if they had just seen a horizontal array, and the reverse was true for English speakers”

For a long time it was hypothesized that this is only true for concepts that are directly dependent on language. For example, time is a construct, a human construct we embed in our thinking through using different words. Without language, time would be hard to conceptualize. For a long time colour perception was thought to provide a counterexample. It was thought that across languages, colour categories are largely universal, reflecting their evolutionary and perceptual salience. Unlike abstract constructs such as time, colour is directly observable, so linguistic variation should have limited impact on perception (Heider, 1972). But is this true? It turns out, not really.

Newer studies found that colour perception is also dependent on our language, specifically our vocabulary. Some languages have many words for colours, while others have only a few, "light" and "dark." Languages also differ in where they put boundaries between colours. While English uses the single word "blue" for many shades, Russian requires speakers to distinguish between light blue (goluboy) and dark blue (siniy). This constant linguistic practice sharpens their perception. Studies show that Russian speakers are measurably faster at discriminating between light and dark blue shades. This cognitive difference is also reflected in brain activity. When viewing colours shifting from light to dark blue, the brains of Russian speakers react as if a categorical change has occurred, while the brains of English speakers, who lack this linguistic boundary, do not register the same "surprise" (Winawer et al. 2007; Boroditsky, 2018).

source: https://medium.com/spotless-says/how-to-change-user-behaviour-1000b3ef63ca

The Limits of the Cage

However, language is not the sole determinant of cognition.

Regarding higher cognitive functions, research shows that language is not always the limiting factor for thought. Recent work argues that language functions primarily as a tool for communication, and while it is crucial as a medium for learning and memory, it is not indispensable for conceptual or mathematical reasoning (Fedorenko et al., 2003). Fedorenko et al. (2003) suggest that neural networks supporting functions like mathematical reasoning are distinct from language networks and that children with linguistic deficits, such as aphasia, do not necessarily show substantial impairments in non-linguistic thought tasks. Language, therefore, can be seen as a structural scaffold, a vehicle for organizing, transmitting, and retaining knowledge, rather than as the sole determinant of cognition!

(Fedorenko et al., 2003)

This leads to a nuanced conclusion: thought is not hopelessly trapped within language. Instead, language is a powerful guide, shaping and enriching our mental life. Thus the weaker form of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, linguistic relativity, is tentatively supported by the evidence. Language influences our habitual patterns of thought. However language is not an absolute cage for logical thinking, it is a guide, a transfer tool.

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The Bilingual Mind

This understanding of language as a cognitive guide rather than an absolute constraint brings us to a fascinating natural experiment: the bilingual mind. And yes we will digress here a bit, intentionally (because it is interesting).

The reason the bilingual mind is the ideal subject lies in the direct extension to the philosophical premise that a single language creates a single "world" or "thought cage" through which we think. As we have now learned language does guide our thoughts and consequently also our behaviour. This immediately raises a critical question for those who speak two languages: Do two distinct worlds operate within one person? Does a bilingual individual have two separate "cages," or do they merge into a single, more complex framework?

In this article, we define a bilingual as anyone who regularly uses a native tongue (L1) and a second language (L2), regardless of the age of acquisition. This definition is significant because it actually applies to a majority of the global population, as more people are bilingual than monolingual; making this inquiry relevant to the most common human linguistic experience.

This leaves us with two profound questions, I shall answer in this article

• Structure: Are L1 and L2 represented in distinct neural areas, symbolizing two different patterns of thought, or do they operate within a shared, overlapping network?

• Function: As a bilingual person switches between languages, do they also switch their personality or emotional state, as if entering a different "world," just as Wittgenstein's theory would suggest?

We will begin by addressing the first of these questions, examining the neuroscientific evidence for how L1 and L2 are organized in the brain.

Neuroscience of Bilingualism

The neuroscientific question is whether these differences in thought structures have a counterpart in the brain’s organisation. Are L1 and L2 processed in the same neural systems, or are they represented in distinct networks? Is the difference between languages purely linguistic, or is it also embodied in the architecture and function of the brain?

These questions become particularly vivid when we look at cases of language loss. For example, in certain forms of aphasia, one language may be lost while the other is preserved, suggesting that the two may rely on partially distinct neural substrates. In the following, we will explore what current research reveals about how multiple languages are represented, accessed, and sometimes selectively impaired in the brain.

If we turn to the neuroscientific evidence, the picture of how L1 and L2 are represented in the brain is far from straightforward. Research does not converge on a single model. Some studies suggest that both languages are integrated within largely overlapping neural systems, while others report distinct cortical areas for each language (Połczyńska et al., 2020, Kim et al., 1997).

To investigate this, researchers often use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which measures changes in blood oxygenation. Because oxygenated and deoxygenated blood have different magnetic properties, fMRI can track regional changes in neural activity with reasonable spatial precision. By having participants perform linguistic tasks in L1 and L2 inside the scanner, researchers can compare the spatial patterns of activation between the two languages.

One meta-analysis Połczyńska (2020) found that separate cortical representations for L1 and L2 are common rather than exceptional. Other studies suggest that L1 and L2 usually share a common “represenation” (Sulpizio et al., 2020, illes et al., 1999). However, when considering the broader literature, a more nuanced pattern emerges: there is typically substantial overlap between L1 and L2 networks, but each language tends to recruit dedicated regions that are preferentially recruited for one language (Sulpizio et al., 2020). This is particularly evident for L2, which often engages additional neural resources.

Thus, the distinction between L1 and L2 appears not only in linguistic and cognitive terms but also in the brain’s physical organisation. However the research does not give us a clear picture of whether L1 and L2 are completely distinctly represented or if they are largely found in a common network. Why might this be?

For the answer we need to look into factors that differently affect how L1 and L2 are interconnected.

Factors that Modulate the Activation Pattern

(Kim et al., 1997): you can see that early speakers have more overlapping L1 and L2 representations than late ones (right)

Linguistic distance refers to how similar or different two languages are in their structure, phonology, and grammar. Languages that are closely related, such as Mandarin and Cantonese, tend to share more neural resources (Połczyńska et al., 2020). Conversely, languages that are structurally distant, such as German and Mandarin, are less likely to share neural representations, resulting in more distinct cortical patterns. In general, greater linguistic distance corresponds to greater neural separation.

The second major factor is the age of acquisition. Early acquisition, for example, learning an L2 before the age of five, is associated with greater co-localization of L1 and L2 in language-related areas such as Broca's area (Połczyńska et al., 2020, Kim et al., 1997). In such cases, the two languages appear to be integrated into a single, interconnected network. By contrast, late acquisition often leads to more distinct neural representations, with L1 and L2 activating more divergent regions, a landmark finding first demonstrated by Kim et al. (1997).

These neural differences have clear cognitive implications. Early bilinguals often switch fluidly between languages, drawing on both for thought and expression without conscious effort. Late learners may experience more separation between languages in use, and potentially more cognitive cost when switching between them.

The third key factor is language proficiency. Higher proficiency is associated with greater neural overlap between L1 and L2 (Sebastian et al., 2011; Połczyńska et al., 2020). Conversely, lower proficiency tends to be linked with more distinct neural representations. This relationship is captured in what has been called the convergence hypothesis: the more proficient a person becomes in a second language, the more L2's neural representation converges with that of L1.

To summarize the evidence:

• Early acquisition, high proficiency, and small linguistic distance are associated with more integrated neural networks for L1 and L2.

• Late acquisition, low proficiency, and large linguistic distance tend to produce more distinct and topographically separate activation patterns.

These findings suggest that the degree of overlap between L1 and L2 networks is not fixed but shaped by developmental and experiential factors. If the two languages are highly integrated, as in early, proficient bilingualism, they may function in thought as a single, interconnected network. In such cases, switching between languages during thinking might involve minimal cognitive cost, and the conceptual frameworks associated with each language may blend more than we might expect. This perspective adds nuance to the view of languages as distinct "frameworks" for thought—while linguistic structure can set boundaries on expression, high integration at the neural level may soften those boundaries, allowing concepts and meanings to flow more freely between languages.

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What Aphasia Patients Tell Us

Another way to approach the question of neural representation is through clinical cases of aphasia—language disorders that can result from brain damage. Aphasia has multiple causes, but the most common is stroke. It can occur in both monolingual and bilingual individuals.

Aphasia takes different forms. In Broca’s aphasia, speech production is impaired while comprehension remains relatively intact. In Wernicke’s aphasia, the opposite pattern is observed: patients can produce fluent-sounding speech, but the content is nonsensical, often composed of grammatically correct yet meaningless sentences. This is striking because, to a casual listener, the person may seem to speak normally, until the lack of coherent meaning becomes apparent.

For our purposes, the most relevant cases are those involving bilingual speakers. Here, aphasia can affect only one language or both. Interestingly, some patients lose their L1 but retain L2; others lose L2 but preserve L1; and in some cases, both are impaired (Fabbro, 2001). This variability suggests that the neural organization of multiple languages is not fixed in a single pattern as I already pointed out.

One particularly intriguing phenomenon is cross-linguistic transfer, improvement in one language following therapy or relearning in the other. For example, Marangolo et al. (2009) reported a patient who had lost both Italian and Flemish but, after relearning Italian, also showed improvement in Flemish.

These cases challenge the idea of completely separate, self-contained language networks. A systematic review of treatment effects has shown that therapy in one language can lead to improvements in the untreated language (Faroqi-Shah et al., 2010). This evidence demonstrates that, within the same individual, the boundaries between languages can be porous, allowing recovery in one to support recovery in the other. At the same time, they underline the complexity of bilingual neural organization: there is no simple answer to whether L1 and L2 are entirely integrated or entirely distinct. The clinical evidence points to a dynamic and interactive system, sensitive to both developmental history and patterns of use.

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Switching Worlds: Emotion and Personality

Now we shall turn to the behavioural level. While the neural evidence is intriguing, behaviour offers another lens through which to examine the relationship between L1 and L2. We might observe distinct emotional responses depending on the language being used, and in some cases, even differences in perceived personality.

From a linguistic perspective, this makes sense. We construct “pictures of facts” and the tools with which we paint those pictures matter. Each language functions as a different set of brushes and colours. If language shapes the way we construct our reality, then using different languages could influence not only how we think about the world, but also how we feel and react to it. Words differ in their valence, connotations, and emotional resonance across languages, and such differences could subtly alter a speaker’s behaviour, self-expression, and even self-perception.

This raises a compelling question for research: can systematic differences in emotional and behavioural patterns between L1 and L2 be observed, and if so, how might they be explained?

Language processing is closely intertwined with neural systems involved in emotional regulation. Key structures include the amygdala, prefrontal cortex (PFC), hippocampus, insula, and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). While these are not the only regions involved, they are central for our purposes here.

• Amygdala – Crucial for fear responses, linking sensory input with emotional valence, and supporting emotional conditioning.

• Prefrontal cortex – Governs cognitive control, integrating information and supporting reappraisal strategies.

• Hippocampus – Links present sensory input to stored memories, including emotionally salient ones.

• Insula – Mediates interoceptive awareness (e.g., perceiving fear-induced heart rate changes) and is implicated in self-related and empathic processing.

• Anterior cingulate cortex – Involved in both pain perception and in resolving emotional–cognitive conflicts.

Language engages many of these same systems, especially the PFC, which is essential for both cognitive control in language learning (e.g., acquiring English or German) and for contextualizing and regulating emotions. But is also important to form memories or to process emotions.

In childhood, increasing linguistic competence facilitates more deliberate emotional awareness and regulation strategies. Early on, children begin to verbalize emotions, which fosters greater emotional clarity and processing.

Developmentally, the amygdala matures earlier than the PFC, which has implications for emotional regulation and language use. Stronger connectivity between the amygdala, hippocampus, and PFC over time supports more effective integration of emotion and language.

The core mechanism is early affective coding of linguistic stimuli within the limbic system. In a first language (L1), acquisition occurs during periods of intense emotional and cognitive development, leading to deep integration with early memories and emotional reactions. Consequently, L1 is often more emotionally charged than later-learned languages (L2), as it is embedded within the neural networks that formed during early life experiences.

Pavlenko (2008) found that bilingual individuals exhibit stronger physiological responses to emotionally charged words in their first language (L1) compared to their second language (L2). This suggests that emotional words in L2 do not elicit the same degree of arousal, pointing toward a deeper emotional embedding of L1. Because of this early coupling, L1 is more closely tied to autobiographical memory, affective experience, and the neural systems underpinning emotion (Pavlenko, 2006).

In contrast, an L2 learned later in life is often processed in a way that engages more cognitive control. This recruits the prefrontal cortex to a greater extent, leading to more deliberate monitoring of speech and a reduced direct connection to emotional memory. Consequently, L2 often feels more “emotionally distant” and produces less amygdala activation. This emotional detachment can make L2 a preferred medium when discussing traumatic or highly emotional experiences, as it buffers the speaker from the full affective weight of the topic (Dewaele, 2004).

The influence of language extends beyond emotion into personality expression. Different languages carry different lexical resources, syntactic structures, and culturally embedded norms, all of which can subtly shift the way a speaker thinks, frames ideas, and presents themselves. This is reflected in the phenomenon of cultural frame-switching, in which bilinguals adapt their behavioural and personality expression depending on the language context.

When bilinguals complete personality assessments in both of their languages, striking shifts can occur. In one study, Spanish–English bilinguals scored higher on extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness when tested in English than when tested in Spanish, despite being the same individuals (Ramírez-Esparza et al., 2006). This suggests that language can act as a cognitive–cultural lens, influencing how one self-describes and behaves (Ervin, 1964). For example, a bilingual speaker might portray themselves as more structured and orderly when using German, while presenting as more open and outgoing when speaking English, reflecting not a change in core personality, but a shift in the expressive repertoire available in each linguistic and cultural framework.

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Conclusion

What does this all tell us? Language is indeed a powerful guide to our perception of reality and can even shape our behaviour. However, it is not an absolute cage. Mathematical and logical thought can be independent of language, raising the intriguing question: how do we conceptualize logical concepts without relying on language?

The bilingual mind offers a particularly compelling example of multiple languages coexisting within a single individual. Here, we observe that switching languages can influence not only thought but also aspects of emotional expression and personality. Early bilinguals, in particular, may possess more integrated language systems, potentially shaping how they perceive and interpret the world. This integration could lead to a richer inner experience and a more nuanced understanding of reality. This also, again, highlights the profound cognitive and experiential benefits of language learning.

The takeaway is clear: Wittgenstein was right to emphasize the foundational role of language in logical thought and philosophy. Psychological research supports this view, yet it also shows that we can, at times, “think outside of language.” Language is not an absolute determinant of thought, but it exerts a profound and pervasive influence.

Futher Aids

I used LLM (large-language-models) for this article as outlined in my article for responsible AI use, which you can read here:

How to Use AI Responsibly (In My Opinion)

Please also note that I translated the quotes by Wittgenstein and Nietzsche myself. It is the direct translation from the original German work, but may not be the official “English” version.

References and Reading Suggestions

First of all check out this great article on Medium by Francesco Franco, which helped me to understand the difference in the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and Wittgensteins work:

https://medium.com/@francescofranco_39234/wittgensteins-philosophy-and-the-sapir-whorf-hypothesis-d651c20d7c40#:~:text=The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis tends,practices shapes meaning and understanding.

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