I explore topics in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy. My focus is on reading and reflecting on books, research and academic papers. Occasionally, I share personal takes, but at the core, I aim to communicate what fascinates me in these fields.
Ludwig and Hitler were both in the same school, haha!! I never knew that. For about 2–3 months I had an idea for an article about how skin color developed in different peoples on different continents, more about melanin production and environmental factors like sunlight and how it saves from UV rays. But I thought people might take it as a racist standpoint, so I ended up dropping the idea.
This is detailed. Thank you. It's strange to me that people see diverse phenotypes as anything other than being influenced by genetic drift and other natural pressures, none of which have led to any recent speciation of homo sapiens sapiens; i.e., we are "inbred" on a global scale.
This was a great read. I know someone who could really use this article, and I plan to share it when we’re in person next. Thank you for all the time and thought you put into this!
Very Interesting, and fully agree ! I skimmed and will read fully later . Congratulations on such good writing. I published on same topic, with an emphasis on Foucault's analysis of race as an epistemic space. Kant is a most interesting part of the story.
This article comes at the perfect time, honestly! I was just thinking about this after my Pilate's class this morning, how the narratives we create about bodies can be so misleading. How can we better educate people on this, especially those who cling to old definitions?
What do you do with the observation that there are many biological/phenotypical correlates to ethnicity such that significant clusters of ethnicities share similar correlated biological/phenotypical patterns? Do you want a word or category to describe the group of people with different ethnic identities that share hair color, eye color, susceptibility or resistance to certain diseases, ability to tolerate substances like lactose or alcohol, etc.? I suppose you could nominate something like "ancestry," but I wonder how long such a substitute would remain unattached to the negative or misleading connotations that you currently ascribe to "race."
Tim, I’d love to know your thoughts on the question above.
Your essay clearly articulates why race is not a discrete biological category, but I’ve never seen anyone arguing for that. I’ve seen people 1) arguing that currently there are clusters of observable traits and behaviors and 2) discriminate on that basis. The latter is generally undesirable, but the first is that you call race (on a less scientific and interchangeable way with ethnicity) and it’s a useful concept even if no concrete barrier separates “iberic” from “Asian”.
You can imagine a 1 meter tall bar stool. How wide does it have to be to stop being a stool and start being a table? There is no clear point, but that doesn’t mean stools and tables aren’t real.
All my life I’ve been told I looked half Italian, half Moroccan. The tool gave me 25% North African, 25% Italian, 50% Iberic, which I am but until doing the test I didn’t even know was an ethnicity/race.
The FST gradient analysis really nails why clustering methods can mislead. I ran into something similiar when reviewing population genomic data where the structure plot looked categorical until we sampled more densely across geographic regions, then the boundaries vanished into clines. The point about phenotype (like skin color) being a poor proxy for overall genetic similarity is underappreciated. I've seen people assume Maasai and Khoisan cluster tighterthan either does with Greeks based purely on visible traits, not realizing the Out-of-Africa bottleneck creates that counterintuitive pattern. The Wittgenstein framing adds depth to why this matters beyond just correcting statistical literacy.
Thought provoking - thank you. Liked how you deconstructed this issue and why it persists. Particularly liked the study showing the impact of environment on personal growth (the plant example) - a very simple intuitive reminder of how our environment shapes us, despite our potential.
I’m glad to share the acknowledgment of language differences. Elsewhere we can read of the value of learning a second language, not just to be able to communicate with people who speak that language, but to enter into a new framework of understanding and thinking about the world. And we agree there are cultural differences as well: manner of dress, cuisine, social customs, etc. As I cross from Germany into Poland, you’re right- I see no visible change in the physical characteristics of the people on one side of the invisible and arbitrary line we call a border. As I move eastward the changes in physical characteristics are slight. You’re right that they change a little bit more as I continue eastward and, imperceptibly, they keep changing as I go. When I reach my destination, Japan, the people there nonetheless look quite different than the people in Germany. That doesn’t make one group superior than the other. They simply are different. Like changes in the color spectrum, the physical characteristics of people change by gradience. Nonetheless, we can say to the person sitting across the table from us “Please hand me that pen. No, not the blue one, the red one” and not have the color become a point of contention.
It would be helpful to have a word for this phenomenon that people are indeed aware of, this overlay of language, custom, and physical characteristics. Not that the word has to have a black-or-white definition, so to speak. Words have meaning, by definition, and as well words have multiple definitions by use and by context as well. The use of the word that describes the overlay I am speaking of has negative implications, to be sure. But people say wrong things all the time. Using a word to slur or demean others is not necessarily caused by the word I’m speaking of, it’s the misuse of the word that is wrong. “Don’t say that word” is an appropriate rejoinder to someone who has uttered a slur. We know what they have meant. “That’s not what that word means” is a response to the misuse of a word, a response that can help bridge misunderstanding, especially when that misunderstanding is untrue and abusive.
There are already useful words for this, they just aren't used as widely as "race". And, semantics is also a source of confusion here. My personal favourite to replace "race" to denominate characteristic differences in biology is "phenotype" where "pheno" means "observe" or "observable". Instead of a single trait or feature, it describes "observable convergence of many characteristics". Hence, it can be used across human contexts to describe biological phenotypes, psychological phenotypes, cultural phenotypes, etc. Most importantly, it assumes biological, psychological and socio-cultural clustering of characteristics yet affords unique variation of single traits within those areas.
If "race" gets replaced with "phenotype," do the racial categories get new names, or do the same names still apply? Are there black, white, asian, american phenotypes?
In my view, race is not a biological term to begin with. So-called "racial categories" are already obsolete because they are abstract social constructs that lack any objectively defined criteria. For example, there is no objectively observable threshold between "black" and "non-black" race. There's no such races like "asian" or "white" if the criteria used for their differentiation can not be established. Race is usually used in relation to single traits like skin colour, or as ethnic/geographic associations, phenotype refers observable expression of many clustered traits combined. Race is used to infer differences between populations, but phenotype refers to within-population differences. Phenotypes are not geographical populations or ethnic groups, they are trait clusters expressed by people. Simply put, people are not phenotypes, they express phenotypes. I personally would not mind getting rid of the term "race" altogether, there´s no reason why we should use such a vague and undefinable term.
You can describe observable individual traits like hairstyle/color, height, tone of voice, skin color, etc. , but conflating those to "race" categories is a mistake. People express traits and phenotypes, not races.
I think it is useful to have words that describe clusters of highly correlated traits and phenotypes that emerge in concert with shared ancestry. It is also useful to have enough facility with language to be able to deploy terms that are appropriate at different levels of scale. I don't think throwing away telescopes and insisting on only using microscopes is going to improve our ability to talk about solar flares. You won't be able to talk people out of racial essentialism if you refuse to talk about race.
Interesting read and it touches upon some issues I have a long-time personal interest in. While the essay is rhetorically effective, it overcorrects by smuggling a soft developmental indeterminism under the banner of anti-racial biology. It assumes that rejecting race-as-taxon requires rejecting any biologically grounded grouping of humans. That leap does not logically follow.
While I agree that "race" is a non-biological term, I still think homo sapiens exhibits biological phenotypes. The cited statement "Human populations have always interbred, creating continuous genetic gradients rather than isolated groups (Cavalli-Sforza, 1992)" sounds inaccurate to me, because seems to imply that we would be a biological blank slate and that nurture alone would determine human development. We aren't a blank slate. All individuals inherit their DNA from their parents, as they inherited from theirs. This creates specific genetic lineages (with specific traits). And, because no human lineages have mixed with all other lineages, the genetic lineages are preserved across generations. In humans, yes, there is a continuous genetic variation, but within that variation there are discrete phenotypic groups. These are not isolated groups (although some might still be, like the uncontacted sentinelese), but mixed within the human societies. And because there is assortative mating in humans, these lineages are preserved across time despite gene flow. So humans are not blank slates, and denying existence of races does not require denying inherited structure, lineage persistence, or discrete phenotypic clustering within a continuous genetic field.
Across the article, the argument against race overreaches into an argument against biological structure per se. That overreach is not supported by evolutionary biology, population genetics, or developmental theory. The essay’s hidden assumption is: “no subspecies = no biological grouping”. This is the deepest conceptual flaw. Biology does not operate on a binary: either subspecies, or blank slate. There is an enormous middle ground, such as ecotypes, morphs, behavioral syndromes, reaction norms, adaptive strategies, developmental attractors. The essay treats subspecies as the only legitimate biological grouping, then declares victory when humans fail to qualify. That’s like saying: “Because humans don’t have castes like ants, they have no social structure.” It’s a logical non sequitur.
There are also many creeping category errors inside the essay, for example this passage collapses under its own definitions:
"Consequently, while dog breeds can be treated as distinct races in a biological framework, humans do not meet the same standard (Norton et al., 2019). Even chimpanzees can be subdivided into races but humans cannot (Templeton, 2013)."
Here, the essay implies that dogs and chimpanzees obey different biological principles than humans. They do not. All three are sexually reproducing species, show gene flow within species, exhibit heritable trait clustering and population structure without speciation. Earlier, the essay insists that “race” is a sociolinguistic construct when applied to humans, not a biological one. But in the dog/chimpanzee comparison it silently switches definitions:
Race (human context) → cultural, historical, linguistic category
Race (dog/chimp context) → biological subdivision based on genetic clustering
Those are not the same concept, but the essay treats them as if they were, and that’s the mistake:
If race is purely cultural, then: dogs do not have races, chimpanzees do not have races, and only humans do, because culture is the criterion.
Yet, if race is biological, then: dogs clearly have biologically structured populations, chimpanzees can be subdivided, and the argument must explain why humans would be exempt from the same biological logic. The essay tries to have it both ways.
I think we must be careful with binary statements. Humans have no reproductively isolated groups, so they have no sub-species. Humans are not a single-phenotype species. Many species show multiple stable phenotypes, overlapping populations, gene flow, yet no subspecies designation. Humans fitting this pattern is not radical. What’s radical is pretending they don’t.
My personal view is that "race" is a socio-cultural term, and the existence of biological grouping in humans relies on at least three mechanisms the essay underplays:
a) there is lineage persistence: Haplogroups already prove that inheritance leaves durable structure despite gene flow.
b) there is canalised development: Discrete phenotypes can emerge from continuous inputs. This is standard developmental biology.
c) there is assortative mating: Non-random pairing preserves trait bundles without requiring isolation.
None of these require subspecies, none imply blank-slate humans. none contradict clinality.
I appreciate the detailed feedback, but your critique relies on attributing a position to me that I do not hold: that rejecting "race" as a biological category implies humans are a "blank slate" or that genes do not influence development. I basically agree with your points regarding the existence of lineage persistence and assortative mating; biological structure absolutely exists. However, I explicitly state in the article: "I am of course not denying that we can tell who comes from where, or that distinct phenotypic differences exist." My argument is that these mechanisms do not produce the discrete, bounded categories required to biologically define a "race" or subspecies.
Your argument regarding lineage persistence and the ability to group humans based on traits is essentially a restatement of the argument made by Edwards (2003). However, as I detail in the text, modern analyses like those by Roseman (2021) and Rosenberg have shown that Edwards conflated assignment (the ability to sort individuals based on correlation) with taxonomy (the existence of distinct evolutionary subspecies). Geographical distance alone is not a meaningful metric to assert "races," and phenotypes, as shown by the study by Mallick et al., do not necessarily imply the genetic grouping you suggest. The characteristics we choose to define these "races" are arbitrary. To use an analogy: two dogs of the same breed can have completely different fur colors. We can distinguish them easily, and we might even be able to assert lineage based on that color. But does that mean there is a meaningful difference that makes them separate races? No, they remain the same race. The ability to spot a difference does not validate a taxonomic category.
Regarding your point on the dog and chimpanzee comparison, you accuse me of a category error, but I am actually applying the exact same biological standard to all three species. Dogs, due to artificial selection and isolation, exhibit high FST values and distinct, non-overlapping genetic clusters; therefore, biologically, they can be grouped into breeds. Chimpanzees have been separated for huge timescales and show deep genetic splits. Humans, however, have low FST values, high gene flow, and continuous variation. We fail to meet the statistical threshold that dogs and chimpanzees meet. When I say race is a social construct in humans, it is not because I am changing the definition of race for us, but because humans fail to meet the biological criteria that define subspecies in other animals. Furthermore, reason why I think in humans it is a social construct I explained in one of the last paragraphs "Biological Fiction, Social Reality" - which explains the point. To explain it again, "race" is a biological term and while some animals can be divided in distinct races, humans cannot (therefore human races do not exist in a biological sense). At the same time, society is structured in a way as if human races were a real thing, which creates in a Wittgensteinian sense the social construct "race". No category error in sight.
So I really appreciate the feedback, but it is largely based on asserting positions I do not even hold (and explicitly state something else in the text). To be precise, my text agrees with most points you stated in the end.
Thanks, but now I’m confused and I think we’re dancing around semantics and it’s time to start defining terms. I think we’re close, but we’re still talking past each other because the key terms are sliding. Since the term “race” is not clearly defined in the article, let’s begin from there: In your view, is “race” a biological or cultural term? If human races don’t exist but dog and chimpanzee races do, on what premise, under what criteria?
Could you then define, explicitly and operationally:
What you mean by “race” in non-human biology (dogs/chimpanzees), including whether you treat it as synonymous with “subspecies” or as something else.
What you mean by “subspecies,” including the criteria you think must be met (e.g., reproductive isolation, depth of divergence, cluster separability, FST thresholds, diagnostic loci, etc.). If you use thresholds, please state them.
Whether, under your definitions, “breed” is a taxonomic category or merely an artificial lineage class (and how that affects the dog analogy).
Once those definitions are fixed, we dialogue and respond precisely without either of us accidentally arguing against a moving target.
There is no discrete, physical boundary between a chair and a bed. Some chairs are big enough to lay on, some you can sleep on, some have pillows and blankets on them. Some beds can be stiff and short, or have a head board that looks like a chair back. Just because there is not a precise, physical boundary between a chair and a bed, does not mean that we must no longer use the "chair-bed" classification scheme. Calling certain things chairs and certain things beds is useful because we exist in a world with things that are obviously beds or obviously chairs. Just because there are some objects that exist which we aren't sure if they are technically chairs, or technically beds, means absolutely nothing. We may not know if a particular water molecule in the Rio Grande is technically part of the USA or part of Mexico, but everyone knows Nebraska is in the USA and the Yucatán is in Mexico. Fuzziness at a boundary does not mean fuzziness across the whole terrain.
Ludwig and Hitler were both in the same school, haha!! I never knew that. For about 2–3 months I had an idea for an article about how skin color developed in different peoples on different continents, more about melanin production and environmental factors like sunlight and how it saves from UV rays. But I thought people might take it as a racist standpoint, so I ended up dropping the idea.
This is detailed. Thank you. It's strange to me that people see diverse phenotypes as anything other than being influenced by genetic drift and other natural pressures, none of which have led to any recent speciation of homo sapiens sapiens; i.e., we are "inbred" on a global scale.
*I apologize for the typos.
i just found out about substack and i had the pleasure of coming across your articles. keep up your amazing work!
Super interesting read - especially the discussion around the diversity "within groups" exceeds that found "outside of groups". Thanks for sharing!
This was a great read. I know someone who could really use this article, and I plan to share it when we’re in person next. Thank you for all the time and thought you put into this!
OSF | Towards a historical ontology of racial knowledge - the epistemic space of race https://share.google/Nr4zWAstw3EwSLt3D
Very Interesting, and fully agree ! I skimmed and will read fully later . Congratulations on such good writing. I published on same topic, with an emphasis on Foucault's analysis of race as an epistemic space. Kant is a most interesting part of the story.
This article comes at the perfect time, honestly! I was just thinking about this after my Pilate's class this morning, how the narratives we create about bodies can be so misleading. How can we better educate people on this, especially those who cling to old definitions?
Would the use of "ethnicity" in place of "race" satisfy your linguistic concerns?
yes, because ethnicity is a social category by definition.
What do you do with the observation that there are many biological/phenotypical correlates to ethnicity such that significant clusters of ethnicities share similar correlated biological/phenotypical patterns? Do you want a word or category to describe the group of people with different ethnic identities that share hair color, eye color, susceptibility or resistance to certain diseases, ability to tolerate substances like lactose or alcohol, etc.? I suppose you could nominate something like "ancestry," but I wonder how long such a substitute would remain unattached to the negative or misleading connotations that you currently ascribe to "race."
Tim, I’d love to know your thoughts on the question above.
Your essay clearly articulates why race is not a discrete biological category, but I’ve never seen anyone arguing for that. I’ve seen people 1) arguing that currently there are clusters of observable traits and behaviors and 2) discriminate on that basis. The latter is generally undesirable, but the first is that you call race (on a less scientific and interchangeable way with ethnicity) and it’s a useful concept even if no concrete barrier separates “iberic” from “Asian”.
You can imagine a 1 meter tall bar stool. How wide does it have to be to stop being a stool and start being a table? There is no clear point, but that doesn’t mean stools and tables aren’t real.
On a last note: I’d invite you to try out https://attractivenesstest.com/ethnicity-test/
All my life I’ve been told I looked half Italian, half Moroccan. The tool gave me 25% North African, 25% Italian, 50% Iberic, which I am but until doing the test I didn’t even know was an ethnicity/race.
Cheers
The FST gradient analysis really nails why clustering methods can mislead. I ran into something similiar when reviewing population genomic data where the structure plot looked categorical until we sampled more densely across geographic regions, then the boundaries vanished into clines. The point about phenotype (like skin color) being a poor proxy for overall genetic similarity is underappreciated. I've seen people assume Maasai and Khoisan cluster tighterthan either does with Greeks based purely on visible traits, not realizing the Out-of-Africa bottleneck creates that counterintuitive pattern. The Wittgenstein framing adds depth to why this matters beyond just correcting statistical literacy.
Thought provoking - thank you. Liked how you deconstructed this issue and why it persists. Particularly liked the study showing the impact of environment on personal growth (the plant example) - a very simple intuitive reminder of how our environment shapes us, despite our potential.
I’m glad to share the acknowledgment of language differences. Elsewhere we can read of the value of learning a second language, not just to be able to communicate with people who speak that language, but to enter into a new framework of understanding and thinking about the world. And we agree there are cultural differences as well: manner of dress, cuisine, social customs, etc. As I cross from Germany into Poland, you’re right- I see no visible change in the physical characteristics of the people on one side of the invisible and arbitrary line we call a border. As I move eastward the changes in physical characteristics are slight. You’re right that they change a little bit more as I continue eastward and, imperceptibly, they keep changing as I go. When I reach my destination, Japan, the people there nonetheless look quite different than the people in Germany. That doesn’t make one group superior than the other. They simply are different. Like changes in the color spectrum, the physical characteristics of people change by gradience. Nonetheless, we can say to the person sitting across the table from us “Please hand me that pen. No, not the blue one, the red one” and not have the color become a point of contention.
It would be helpful to have a word for this phenomenon that people are indeed aware of, this overlay of language, custom, and physical characteristics. Not that the word has to have a black-or-white definition, so to speak. Words have meaning, by definition, and as well words have multiple definitions by use and by context as well. The use of the word that describes the overlay I am speaking of has negative implications, to be sure. But people say wrong things all the time. Using a word to slur or demean others is not necessarily caused by the word I’m speaking of, it’s the misuse of the word that is wrong. “Don’t say that word” is an appropriate rejoinder to someone who has uttered a slur. We know what they have meant. “That’s not what that word means” is a response to the misuse of a word, a response that can help bridge misunderstanding, especially when that misunderstanding is untrue and abusive.
There are already useful words for this, they just aren't used as widely as "race". And, semantics is also a source of confusion here. My personal favourite to replace "race" to denominate characteristic differences in biology is "phenotype" where "pheno" means "observe" or "observable". Instead of a single trait or feature, it describes "observable convergence of many characteristics". Hence, it can be used across human contexts to describe biological phenotypes, psychological phenotypes, cultural phenotypes, etc. Most importantly, it assumes biological, psychological and socio-cultural clustering of characteristics yet affords unique variation of single traits within those areas.
If "race" gets replaced with "phenotype," do the racial categories get new names, or do the same names still apply? Are there black, white, asian, american phenotypes?
In my view, race is not a biological term to begin with. So-called "racial categories" are already obsolete because they are abstract social constructs that lack any objectively defined criteria. For example, there is no objectively observable threshold between "black" and "non-black" race. There's no such races like "asian" or "white" if the criteria used for their differentiation can not be established. Race is usually used in relation to single traits like skin colour, or as ethnic/geographic associations, phenotype refers observable expression of many clustered traits combined. Race is used to infer differences between populations, but phenotype refers to within-population differences. Phenotypes are not geographical populations or ethnic groups, they are trait clusters expressed by people. Simply put, people are not phenotypes, they express phenotypes. I personally would not mind getting rid of the term "race" altogether, there´s no reason why we should use such a vague and undefinable term.
If nebulous boundaries invalidate concepts then there is a lot more than just "race" at stake.
As far as reasons for using a vague term like race, how would you suggest eyewitnesses to describe suspects they saw fleeing the scene of a crime?
You can describe observable individual traits like hairstyle/color, height, tone of voice, skin color, etc. , but conflating those to "race" categories is a mistake. People express traits and phenotypes, not races.
I think it is useful to have words that describe clusters of highly correlated traits and phenotypes that emerge in concert with shared ancestry. It is also useful to have enough facility with language to be able to deploy terms that are appropriate at different levels of scale. I don't think throwing away telescopes and insisting on only using microscopes is going to improve our ability to talk about solar flares. You won't be able to talk people out of racial essentialism if you refuse to talk about race.
I appreciate the insight, JB.
Yes, humans races do exist. The science is clear, and so is the intent of your language games. https://zerocontradictions.net/faqs/race
Interesting read and it touches upon some issues I have a long-time personal interest in. While the essay is rhetorically effective, it overcorrects by smuggling a soft developmental indeterminism under the banner of anti-racial biology. It assumes that rejecting race-as-taxon requires rejecting any biologically grounded grouping of humans. That leap does not logically follow.
While I agree that "race" is a non-biological term, I still think homo sapiens exhibits biological phenotypes. The cited statement "Human populations have always interbred, creating continuous genetic gradients rather than isolated groups (Cavalli-Sforza, 1992)" sounds inaccurate to me, because seems to imply that we would be a biological blank slate and that nurture alone would determine human development. We aren't a blank slate. All individuals inherit their DNA from their parents, as they inherited from theirs. This creates specific genetic lineages (with specific traits). And, because no human lineages have mixed with all other lineages, the genetic lineages are preserved across generations. In humans, yes, there is a continuous genetic variation, but within that variation there are discrete phenotypic groups. These are not isolated groups (although some might still be, like the uncontacted sentinelese), but mixed within the human societies. And because there is assortative mating in humans, these lineages are preserved across time despite gene flow. So humans are not blank slates, and denying existence of races does not require denying inherited structure, lineage persistence, or discrete phenotypic clustering within a continuous genetic field.
Across the article, the argument against race overreaches into an argument against biological structure per se. That overreach is not supported by evolutionary biology, population genetics, or developmental theory. The essay’s hidden assumption is: “no subspecies = no biological grouping”. This is the deepest conceptual flaw. Biology does not operate on a binary: either subspecies, or blank slate. There is an enormous middle ground, such as ecotypes, morphs, behavioral syndromes, reaction norms, adaptive strategies, developmental attractors. The essay treats subspecies as the only legitimate biological grouping, then declares victory when humans fail to qualify. That’s like saying: “Because humans don’t have castes like ants, they have no social structure.” It’s a logical non sequitur.
There are also many creeping category errors inside the essay, for example this passage collapses under its own definitions:
"Consequently, while dog breeds can be treated as distinct races in a biological framework, humans do not meet the same standard (Norton et al., 2019). Even chimpanzees can be subdivided into races but humans cannot (Templeton, 2013)."
Here, the essay implies that dogs and chimpanzees obey different biological principles than humans. They do not. All three are sexually reproducing species, show gene flow within species, exhibit heritable trait clustering and population structure without speciation. Earlier, the essay insists that “race” is a sociolinguistic construct when applied to humans, not a biological one. But in the dog/chimpanzee comparison it silently switches definitions:
Race (human context) → cultural, historical, linguistic category
Race (dog/chimp context) → biological subdivision based on genetic clustering
Those are not the same concept, but the essay treats them as if they were, and that’s the mistake:
If race is purely cultural, then: dogs do not have races, chimpanzees do not have races, and only humans do, because culture is the criterion.
Yet, if race is biological, then: dogs clearly have biologically structured populations, chimpanzees can be subdivided, and the argument must explain why humans would be exempt from the same biological logic. The essay tries to have it both ways.
I think we must be careful with binary statements. Humans have no reproductively isolated groups, so they have no sub-species. Humans are not a single-phenotype species. Many species show multiple stable phenotypes, overlapping populations, gene flow, yet no subspecies designation. Humans fitting this pattern is not radical. What’s radical is pretending they don’t.
My personal view is that "race" is a socio-cultural term, and the existence of biological grouping in humans relies on at least three mechanisms the essay underplays:
a) there is lineage persistence: Haplogroups already prove that inheritance leaves durable structure despite gene flow.
b) there is canalised development: Discrete phenotypes can emerge from continuous inputs. This is standard developmental biology.
c) there is assortative mating: Non-random pairing preserves trait bundles without requiring isolation.
None of these require subspecies, none imply blank-slate humans. none contradict clinality.
I appreciate the detailed feedback, but your critique relies on attributing a position to me that I do not hold: that rejecting "race" as a biological category implies humans are a "blank slate" or that genes do not influence development. I basically agree with your points regarding the existence of lineage persistence and assortative mating; biological structure absolutely exists. However, I explicitly state in the article: "I am of course not denying that we can tell who comes from where, or that distinct phenotypic differences exist." My argument is that these mechanisms do not produce the discrete, bounded categories required to biologically define a "race" or subspecies.
Your argument regarding lineage persistence and the ability to group humans based on traits is essentially a restatement of the argument made by Edwards (2003). However, as I detail in the text, modern analyses like those by Roseman (2021) and Rosenberg have shown that Edwards conflated assignment (the ability to sort individuals based on correlation) with taxonomy (the existence of distinct evolutionary subspecies). Geographical distance alone is not a meaningful metric to assert "races," and phenotypes, as shown by the study by Mallick et al., do not necessarily imply the genetic grouping you suggest. The characteristics we choose to define these "races" are arbitrary. To use an analogy: two dogs of the same breed can have completely different fur colors. We can distinguish them easily, and we might even be able to assert lineage based on that color. But does that mean there is a meaningful difference that makes them separate races? No, they remain the same race. The ability to spot a difference does not validate a taxonomic category.
Regarding your point on the dog and chimpanzee comparison, you accuse me of a category error, but I am actually applying the exact same biological standard to all three species. Dogs, due to artificial selection and isolation, exhibit high FST values and distinct, non-overlapping genetic clusters; therefore, biologically, they can be grouped into breeds. Chimpanzees have been separated for huge timescales and show deep genetic splits. Humans, however, have low FST values, high gene flow, and continuous variation. We fail to meet the statistical threshold that dogs and chimpanzees meet. When I say race is a social construct in humans, it is not because I am changing the definition of race for us, but because humans fail to meet the biological criteria that define subspecies in other animals. Furthermore, reason why I think in humans it is a social construct I explained in one of the last paragraphs "Biological Fiction, Social Reality" - which explains the point. To explain it again, "race" is a biological term and while some animals can be divided in distinct races, humans cannot (therefore human races do not exist in a biological sense). At the same time, society is structured in a way as if human races were a real thing, which creates in a Wittgensteinian sense the social construct "race". No category error in sight.
So I really appreciate the feedback, but it is largely based on asserting positions I do not even hold (and explicitly state something else in the text). To be precise, my text agrees with most points you stated in the end.
Thanks, but now I’m confused and I think we’re dancing around semantics and it’s time to start defining terms. I think we’re close, but we’re still talking past each other because the key terms are sliding. Since the term “race” is not clearly defined in the article, let’s begin from there: In your view, is “race” a biological or cultural term? If human races don’t exist but dog and chimpanzee races do, on what premise, under what criteria?
Could you then define, explicitly and operationally:
What you mean by “race” in non-human biology (dogs/chimpanzees), including whether you treat it as synonymous with “subspecies” or as something else.
What you mean by “subspecies,” including the criteria you think must be met (e.g., reproductive isolation, depth of divergence, cluster separability, FST thresholds, diagnostic loci, etc.). If you use thresholds, please state them.
Whether, under your definitions, “breed” is a taxonomic category or merely an artificial lineage class (and how that affects the dog analogy).
Once those definitions are fixed, we dialogue and respond precisely without either of us accidentally arguing against a moving target.
There is no discrete, physical boundary between a chair and a bed. Some chairs are big enough to lay on, some you can sleep on, some have pillows and blankets on them. Some beds can be stiff and short, or have a head board that looks like a chair back. Just because there is not a precise, physical boundary between a chair and a bed, does not mean that we must no longer use the "chair-bed" classification scheme. Calling certain things chairs and certain things beds is useful because we exist in a world with things that are obviously beds or obviously chairs. Just because there are some objects that exist which we aren't sure if they are technically chairs, or technically beds, means absolutely nothing. We may not know if a particular water molecule in the Rio Grande is technically part of the USA or part of Mexico, but everyone knows Nebraska is in the USA and the Yucatán is in Mexico. Fuzziness at a boundary does not mean fuzziness across the whole terrain.
Check out my posts on ancestry